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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KIM RINDERKNECHT,

]

Plaintiff-Appellant, !
vs.

1»

Case No. 970343-CA

LANCE LUCK,
Defendant-Appellee. ]
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred byvirtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in its application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-201(3)(b) as the basis for its Ruling and Judgment granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment?
Did the court err in finding that a contract had not been
admitted to by Defendant in light of the meaning and intent of Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) (b) ?
Did

the trial

court's err in its granting of Defendant's

motion for summary judgment?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reviews th3 trial court's interpretation
and application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) (b) , which poses a
question of law, for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497, 499

(Utah 1989); Asay v. Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's finding that
Luck did not admit the existence of a contract "for clear error,
reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if [it] otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. ProMax Development v. Mattson, 322 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d
786 (Utah 1988); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P. 2d 472 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) .
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's dismissal of
Rinderknecht' s complaint for correctness, giving no deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions.

First Sec. Bank of Utah v.

Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201, and specifically, Utah Code

Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) .
2.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and specifically,

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal is from a Ruling rendered April 4, 1997 and a
Judgment on Lance Luck's Motion for Summary Judgment rendered May
7, 1997 in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County,
Roosevelt

Department,

State

of

Utah.

The

Judgment

summarily

dismissed Kim Rinderknecht's complaint.

B.
Plaintiff-Appellant

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
(Rinderknecht)

October 22, 1996, alleging breach
purchase and sale of cattle.

of

filed
a oral

a

Complaint

contract

on

for the

(R. 1-5). Defendant-Appellee (Luck)

filed an Answer on November 20, 1996, wherein he asserted statute
of frauds.

(R. 22).

Luck filed a motion for summary judgment on February 7, 1997,
(R. 27), along with a memorandum,

(R. 30), and an affidavit, (R.

36) . Rinderknecht filed memorandum in opposition to Luck's motion
on February 25, 1997, (R. 45), along with an affidavit, (R. 42).
Luck filed a reply memorandum on March 6, 1997, (R. 5 9 ) .
The lower court issued its ruling on April 4, 1997, (R. 78),
and entered its judgment based thereon on May 7, 1997, (R. 81).

3

C.

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT

The trial court issued a ruling granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.
80).

(R. 78-

In its ruling, the Court stated as follows:
The court has reviewed all of [Defendant's] pleading in
this case, including his affidavit, and finds that [Defendant]
has not admitted the existence of a contract. It is true, as
[Plaintiff] notes, that the pleadings exception to the statute
of frauds will never be applicable against a contesting
defendant who is well versed in the law (or who has an
attorney who is so versed) .
The pleading exception is
designed to fulfill the expectation of merchants who are
either not versed in the law or who are too honest to deny the
existence of an unwritten contract. However, the purpose of
the statute of frauds is frustrated if raising the defense is
treated as an admission that a verbal contract exists.

(R. 79).
The trial court signed its Judgment on April 28, 1997 and
filed it May 7, 1997, wherein the Court stated the following:
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the Statute of Frauds
found in Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-2-201.
Plaintiff's
reliance on an exception to the Statute of Frauds found in
70A-2-201(3) is misplaced.
The Court has reviewed all of
Defendant's pleadings in this matter, including Defendant's
Affidavit and finds that Defendant has not admitted the
existence of a contract.
(R. 81-82) .

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant stated in paragraph 3 of his affidavit is support of
his motion for summary judgment as follows:
On or about July 11, 1996, I had a telephone
conversation with Plaintiff Kim Rinderknecht
during which I offered to sell him 240 head of
cattle (steers and h e i f e r s ) . . . . The sales
price was 58 cents ($0.58) per pound for
steers and 52 cents ($0.52) per pound for
heifers.
(R. 36-37) .

Defendant also stated the above in his memorandum

supporting summary judgment. (R. 3 1 ) .
Defendant states in paragraph 4 of his affidavit and paragraph
2. of the relevant facts attached to his memorandum

supporting

motion for summary judgment as follows:
Plaintiff proposed to pay $7,200.00 as a
deposit, with the balance of the sales price
being paid upon completion of the contract, or
the delivery of the cattle.
(R. 37 and R. 31).
Defendant further states in his affidavit that he had not
received the deposit check or written contract as of August 1,
1996.

So he called Plaintiff on that day to discuss Plaintiff's

intentions.
indicated

that

According
Defendant

contract within a few days.

to

Defendant's

would

receive

Affidavit,
the

check

Plaintiff

and

written

(R. 37) . The above is also stated in

defendant's memorandum supporting motion for summary judgment.
31) .
5

(R.

Defendant states that as of August 20, 1996, he had still not
received the deposit check and written contract.
Plaintiff again on that date.

So he called

He could not reach the Plaintiff.

So he sold the cattle elsewhere.

(R. 37).

Defendant states in paragraph 6 of his statement of Relevant
Facts in his memorandum supporting summary judgment that he sold
the

cattle

Plaintiff."

at

a

price

less

than

the

"contract

price

with

(R. 32).

Plaintiff states in his affidavit that on July 11, 1996, the
telephone conversation as presented in Defendant's affidavit did in
fact occur.

(R. 14) .

day he mailed
agreement.

Plaintiff further states that on that same

a deposit

(R. 14).

check

and written

memorandum

of

the

Plaintiff also states that on that same day

he also entered into a similar agreement on the telephone to sell
the same cattle to a feedlot in reliance on the agreement with
Defendant. (R. 14-15).
Plaintiff states in his affidavit that the first telephone
conversation

between

the parties

following

the

July

11,

1996

telephone conversation occurred several days later. (R. 14 and R.
43) .

Plaintiff further states that the Plaintiff offered to hand

deliver the check and written contract to Defendant but Defendant
said that would not be necessary, and that he, the Defendant, would
call Plaintiff in a day or two if he still had not received the

6

check.

(R. 15 and R. 43).

Plaintiff denies that Defendant attempted to reach him at any
time following the telephone conversation near the end of July
1996.

(R. 15 and R. 43-44) . Plaintiff states that he has, and did

have at that time, an answering machine on his telephone as is
always reachable.
Plaintiff

(R. 43).

was

contractually

obligation under the agreement
damages as a result.

committed

to

with the feedlot

fulfill
and

his

sustained

(R. 4-5).

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant on November 4,
1996, alleging breach of contract.

(R. 1-10).

On January 31, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(R. 27-29).

On March 27, 1997, the Eighth Judicial District

Courc of

Duchesne County, State of Utah, Roosevelt Department, issued a
ruling

granting

Defendant's

Motion

dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.

for

Summary

(R. 78-80).

Judgment

and

In its ruling, the

Court stated as follows:
The court has reviewed all of [Defendant's] pleading in
this case, including his affidavit, and finds that [Defendant]
has not admitted the existence of a contract. It is true, as
[Plaintiff] notes, that the pleadings exception to the statute
of frauds will never be applicable against a contesting
defendant who is well versed in the law (or who has an
attorney who is so versed).
The pleading exception is
designed to fulfill the expectation of merchants who are
either not versed in the law or who are too honest to deny the
existence of an unwritten contract. However, the purpose of
7

the statute of frauds is frustrated if raising the defense is
treated as an admission that a verbal contract exists.
(R. 79) .
The Court signed its Judgment on April 28, 1997 and filed it
May 7, 1997, wherein the Court stated the following:
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the Statute of Frauds
found in Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-2-201.
Plaintiff's
reliance on an exception to the Statute of Frauds found in
70A-2-201(3) is misplaced.
The Court has reviewed all of
Defendant's pleadings in this matter, including Defendant's
Affidavit and finds that Defendant has not admitted the
existence of a contract.
(R. 81-82) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's Ruling and Judgment granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment was based on an error in the Court's
application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (3) (b) .

The weight of

legal authority is clearly contrary to basis upon which the trial
court dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
The court was in error in finding that a contract had not been
admitted to by Defendant within the meaning and intent of Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) .
The trial court's granting of Defendant's motion for summary
judgment was an error as a matter of law because genuine issues of
material fact exist.

The weight of legal authority suggests that,

in light of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (3) (b) and UCC § 2-201(3) (b) ,
8

and

in light

of

the

meaning

and

intent

of

these

statutory

provisions, summary dismissal of a complaint upon the basis of the
Statute of Frauds is never appropriate.

ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court's Ruling and Judgment granting Defendants

Motion for Summary Judgment was based on an error in the Court's
application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) (b) .
The

standard

of

review

applied

to

the

trial

court's

interpretation of statutes which pose question of law is for
correctness,

giving

no deference

to the trial

court's legal

conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Asay
v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) (UCC § 2-201(3) (b) ) states as
follows:

A contract: which does not satisfy the
requirements of Subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable if the
party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court chat a contract for sale was made,
but the contract is not enforceable under this
provision beyond the quantity of the goods
admitted . . . .
The only published Utah case that Appellant has found that has
considered the application of the above statute is the case of Lish
v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976).
9

In Lish, the facts state

that the Plaintiff and Defendant had a discussion on the telephone
regarding the sale of 15,000 bushels of wheat.

Plaintiff claimed

that the terms were agreed to over the telephone.

Approximately

two weeks after the telephone conversation, Plaintiff mailed to
Defendant a written confirmation of the telephone call.
later sold his wheat to someone else.
a verbal contract.

Defendant

Plaintiff sued for breach of

Defendant acknowledged in Court that had he

received the written confirmation within a more reasonable time, he
would have considered himself "bound thereby."

The Plaintiff took

the position that this acknowledgment by the Defendant had the
effect of excepting this transaction from the statute of frauds
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) .
held

that

the

acknowledgment

of

the

However, the Court

Defendant

was

merely

a

hypothetical statement and did not constitute an admission as to
the existence of a contract.

The Court further noted that

fl

[t]he

fact appears to be that neither in his pleading nor otherwise did
the Defendant
contract."

acknowledge

that

there

was

a valid

and

binding

The Court thus ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-

201(3) (b) did not apply to except this transaction from the statute
of frauds.
Legal authorities have cited the Lish case for the proposition
that a hypothetical statement does not constitute an admission as
to the existence of a contract for purposes of UCC § 2-201(3) (b) .
10

Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Construction and Application of UCC
§

2-201(3)(b)

Rendering

Contract

of

Sale

Enforceable

notwithstanding Statute of Frauds, to extent it is Admitted in
Pleading, Testimony, or otherwise in Court, 88 A.L.R.3d 416, 427
(1978);

67

Am.

Jur.

2d,

Sales

§

204.

The

Lish

Case

is

distinguishable from this case in that there is no indication in
Lish that the Defendant admitted to anything aside from the fact
that a telephone conversation occurred and there is no hypothetical
statements in this case.
If Lish is applied as legal authority for the proposition that
there was no admission in this case or that the Defendant must
admit in explicit terms the existence of a valid and binding
contract, first, it is not likely that such a case will ever happen
and there is, therefore, no purpose for UCC § 2-201(3) (b), and
second, it will be against the overwhelming majority of the case
law of the other jurisdictions.
A.L.R.3d 416.

See generally, Travers, supra 88

However, the court in this matter, in ruling that

there was no admission and in declaring the alleged contract barred
by the statute of

limitations, clearly applied

Lish

for the

proposition that, in order for UCC § 2-201 (3Mb) to apply, the
defendant would have had to admit not only explicit terms of a
contract but explicitly that in his opinion it is legal and binding
and that the statute of frauds does not apply because of UCC § 211

201(3) (b) .

Based

on

the

following

authorities,

and

on

the

previously cited A.L.R. and Am. Jur. discussions, it is clear that
the Court in this case applied the statute in error.
In

Ouaney

v.

Tobyne,

689

P.2d

844

(Kansas

1984),

the

Plaintiff, a rancher, sued the Defendant, a feed lot operator, for
breach of an oral contract to purchase cattle.

In Defendant's in-

court testimony, he stated (1) he was to purchase 285 steers at 65
cents per pound,

(2) he was satisfied with of quality

of the

steers, (3) the steers were to be weighed at a specified place, (4)
the loading date would be around October 1, 1982, and (5) he would
make a down payment of $8,000.

At trial, the defendant admitted to

further conduct which suggested that he recognized the existence of
a contract although he did not explicitly admit that the contract
was legal and binding.
In applying UCC § 2-201(3) (b) , the Kansas Supreme Court in
Ouaney stated the following:
In the case now before us, we are required to consider
the "admission" made by the defendant, Lowell Tobyne, in
the course of the litigation.
This requires us to
consider any admissions made in his pleadings, testimony,
or otherwise in court to the effect that a contract for
sale was made.
Id. at 849.

Summarizing 88 A.L.R. 3d 416 the Kansas court also

stated as follows:
It has been stated by the courts that the purposes of
[UCC 2-201(3) (b) ] are (1) to provide that a party cannot
admit the existence of an oral contract for the sale of
12

goods and simultaneously claim the benefit of the statute
of frauds, (2) to prevent the statute of frauds from
becoming an ai.d to fraud, and
(3) to expand the
exceptions to the nonenforceability of oral contracts
under the statute of frauds.
In determining what constitutes an admission under UCC 2201(3)(b) the Kansas court in Ouaney went through a rather lengthy
discussion and began by citing Lewis v. Hughes, 346 A. 2d 231 (Md.
1975)

(a case involving the breach of an oral contract for the

purchase of a mobile home) as " [a] leading case in this area."

The

court in Lewis held the following which was quoted by the court in
Ouaney:
Statute of frauds is satisfied . . . when the party
denying the existence of the contract and relying on the
statute takes the stand and, without admitting explicitly
that a contract was made, testifies to facts which as a
matter of law establish that a contract was formed.
Ouaney,

689

P. 2d

at

849.

The

court

in

Ouaney

also

cited

Dancrerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1974) (a case involving
the breach of an oral contract for the sale of potatoes) for the
proposition

"that the parties against whom an oral contract is

sought to be enforced need not admit there is a contract or admit
the contract in the exact terms claimed" and for the proposition
that "if a fair consideration of the party's testimony, and its
implications under the circumstances established by the record,
establishes the claimed agreement, it will be enforced."
689 P.2d at 849.
13

Ouaney,

The

court

in

Ouaney

also

cited

Cargill

Inc.,

Commodity

Marketing Div. v. Hale, 537 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (a case
involving the breach of an oral contract for sale of soybeans) .
The Court in Cargill found that the following exchange upon crossexamination was sufficient to establish defendant's admission under
UCC § 2-201(3) (b) even though defendant denied that there had been
a meeting of the minds:
Q.
Didn't you agree to sell these beans to [plaintiff's
manager] over the phone for a certain price?
A.

Yes, sir.

Cargill, 537 S.W.2d at 669.
Regarding the question of what constitutes an admission, the
court in Ouaney also quoted 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code §
2-201:216, pp. 116-117 (3rd ed. 1982) as follows:
There is an admission for the purpose of UCC § 2-201(3)
when there is a manifestation that fairly communicates
the concept that the party has admitted the existence of
the contract.
It is not necessary that there be an
express declaration that the party "admits" the making of
an oral "contract." It is sufficient that his words or
conduct reasonably lead to that conclusion.
When a party admits facts the legal consequence of which
is that there is a contract, it is to be concluded that
there has been an admission of the existence of the
contract. The fact that the party does not appreciate or
understand that the subsidiary facts admitted by him have
the effect of creating a contract or that he is unwilling
to state that they did does not negate the fact that a
"contract" has been admitted. On this basis, it has been
held that there is an "admission" so as to take an oral
contact out of the statute of frauds when the party
14

denying the existence of a contract and pleading the
statute of frauds testifies to facts from which it can be
concluded that a contract had been formed, even though he
does not expressly admit that a contract was formed.
Ouaney. 689 P.2d at 850.
Ouaney also quoted 2 Williston on Sales, § 14-9, p. 306 (4th
ed. 1974) as follows:
The mere fact that a party has, by pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court admitted to the existence of a
contract does not mean that it is an admission of every
individual term of the contract between the parties. Of
course, if the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits to the terms of the contracts seriatum, it would
be extremely difficult to visualize a situation where the
trier of facts would not find that an oral agreement
between the parties had not in fact taken place.
Ouaney, 689 P.2d at 850.
Finally, the court in Ouaney held as follows:
From our analysis of this testimony, we have concluded
that, although the defendant did not openly and frankly
admit to an oral agreement, his testimony sufficiently
establishes that an oral agreement existed.
The
defendant acknowledged all the principal terms of the
agreement. The parties had agreed on a price per pound,
type and quality of the cattle, place of loading, place
of weighing, and the down payment.
Although the
defendant never paid the down payment or drew up a
written contract as he volunteered to do, we hold that
his testimony contained admissions of his statements and
actions sufficient to satisfy the requirements of [UCC §
2-201(3) (b)] .
Id. at 852.
The following cases also include similar analyses and similar
holdings based on similar facts:

Hale v. Higginbotham, 188 S.E.2d

515 (Ga. 1972)(involving breach of oral contract for sale of milk
15

base) ; Quad

County

Grain,

Inc. v.

Poe, 202 N.W.2d

118

(Iowa

1972) (involving breach of oral contract for sale of corn) ; and,
URSA Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Trent. 374 N.E.2d 1123 (111. App.
Ct. 1978) (involving breach of oral contract for sale of soybeans) .
The North Dakota Supreme Court rereviewed the Dangerfield case
on a second appeal

a quoted the official comment on UCC § 2-

201(3)(b) as follows:
If the making of a contract is admitted in court, either
in a written pleading, by stipulation or by oral
statement before court, not addition writing is necessary
for protection against fraud. Under this section it is
not longer possible to admit the contract in court and
still treat the Statute as a defense.
However, the
contract is not thus conclusively established.
The
admission so made by a party is itself evidential against
him of the truth of the facts so admitted and of nothing
more; as against the other party, it is not evidential at
all.
Dancrerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 189 (N.D. 1977).
in

this

Dangerfield

Commercial

Code

opinion

Service,

also

quoted

Duesenberg

&

3

King,

Bender's
Sales

The court
Uniform
and

Bulk

Transfers, § 2.04[3], pp. 2-80, 2-81 as follows:
The theoretical justification for the Code rule, which
explicitly extends to testimony as well a pleading, is
that a voluntary admission of the existence of a contract
should result in loss of the statute as a defense. The
statute should not be used to perpetrate frauds, and if
under oath the existence of a contract is admitted, the
use of the statute should thereupon be denied.
The
effect of the rule is that it allows the party asserting
the contract to present his oral evidence in proof of its
existence.
Dangerfield, 252 N.W.2d at 190.

The Dangerfield court also quoted
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enlightening language out of the opinion in Kohlmeyer & Company v.
Bowen,

192

application

S.E.2d
of

400, 405

a UCC

(Ga. 1972)

provision

almost

(a case

involving

identical

to UCC

the
§ 2-

201(3) (b) but dealing with the sale of securities), as follows:
[T]here is no requirement that defendant admit the entire
terms of the contract as contended for by the plaintiff
but only that he admit a contract of sale of a state
quantity of described securities at a defined or stated
price. This is sufficient to take the parol contract out
of the statute so that it can be proven and enforced as
proven.
Based

on

the

above

authorities,

the

Court's

ruling

and

judgment in this case as quoted above applied the law in error.

II.

The court was in error in finding that a contract had not been

admitted to by Defendant within the meaning and intent of Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-20K3) (b) .
The Court of Appeals reviews "the trial court's findings of
fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against
the clear weight of the evidence, or if [it] otherwise reach [es] a
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. ProMax Development v.
Mattson, 322 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See State
v. Goodman, 763 P.2d

786

(Utah 1988); Cummings v. Cummings, 821

P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The trial court clearly erred in finding that the defendant in
this case did not admit to the existence of a contract within the
17

meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) .
Ill. The trial court's granting of Defendant's motion for summary
judgment was an error as a matter of law because genuine issues of
material fact exist and because summary judgment is inappropriate
in light of the meaning

and intent of Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-

201(3) (b) .
This Court has stated as follows:
Recognizing that the party adversely affected by the
summary judgment has not had an opportunity for trial,
the court views the facts in the light most favorable to
that party.
Estate Landscape v. Mountain State Telephone, 793 P.2d 415 (Utah
Ct.

App.

1990).

See

also V-l

Oil Company v. Utah State Tax

Commission, 323 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (Utah 1997) .
The Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows:
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) ; Allen v. Ortezf 802 P.2d 1307,
1309 (Utah 1990).
This

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

stated

the

following

as the

standard for review of the trial court's dismissal via summary
judgment:
We review a summary judgment for correctness, affording
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993).
18

According the following quoted line of cases under UCC § 2201(3) (b), the meaning and intent of UCC § 2-201(3) (b) is that
summary judgment on the ground that the alleged contract is barred
or unenforceable is never appropriate by the clear language of the
statute.

Again, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (3) (b) states in

pertinent part as follows:
A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of Subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable if the
party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract for sale was made, .
(emphasis added).

This statute contemplates that there will be

more than a summary dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint before
the statute of frauds is applied to bar enforcement of a oral
contract.

Therefore, assuming that the court was proper in

determining that the Defendant did not admit to the existence of a
contract in his affidavit, summary judgment was still improper.
Because of the affidavit, there remains many questions regarding
the telephone conversation of July 11, 1996, regarding the parties'
conduct following the telephone conversation, and regarding the
parties' prior course of dealing with each other, with others, and
the general course of dealing between cattle traders and ranchers.
There certainly remains questions about whether or not there was an
oral contract between the parties and whether or not defendant will
19

further admit to the existence of the contract through discovery
and in court testimony.
Again, the official comment on UCC § 2-201(3)(b) states as
follows:
If the making of a contract is admitted in court, either
in a written pleading, by stipulation or by oral
statement before court, not addition writing is necessary
for protection against fraud.
Thus the purpose of the statute is frustrated if the complaint to
enforce an oral contract is summarily dismissed.
Appeals of Georgia follow this line of reasoning
Piatt, 147 S.E.2d 374
reversed

a demurrer

(Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
to a petition

The Court of
in Garrison v.

The Garrison Court

alleging breach

of

a oral

contract for sale of a trailer on the ground that the granting of
a demurrer is contrary to the intent of UCC § 2-201(3) (b).

The

court stated as follows:
Since a contract, which is within the statute at the time
of filing the petition or cross action, can become
enforceable by admission only in the case itself by the
party charged, rather than admissions made outside the
case prior to the filing of the petition or cross action,
it would therefore, be contrary to the intention and
purpose of the statutory change to permit the sustaining
of a demurrer to a petition or cross action upon such a
contract based on the ground that such petition or cross
action shows upon its face that the contract is within
the statute of frauds when it may become enforceable by
acts occurring after the petition or cross action is
filed. If a demurrer on this ground should be sustained
to the petition, the plaintiff is denied his opportunity
of determining on a trial whether the making of the
contract would be admitted and thus made enforceable for
the first time.
By these changes in the statute of
20

frauds, it is clearly the intent of the legislature that
the enforceability of a contract, which on its face may
be within the statute, is tested by the answer, testimony
or plea of the party charged, and not merely by the
allegations in the petition or cross action brought to
enforce the contract.
It follows, therefore, that a
petition upon such a contract which is valid in other
respects is not demurrable because it shows on its face
that it is within the statute of frauds.
Id. at 375.
In the case of M & W Farm Serv. Co. v. Callison, 285 N.W.2d
271 (Iowa 1979) , a case involving the breach of a oral contract for
the purchase of LP gas tanks, the Iowa Supreme Court stated the
following:
M & W's key assertion is that Callison7s claims against
M & W are based on the contract which the pleadings
indisputably
reveal
was
unwritten
and
therefore
unenforceable.
In its view, any controverted facts
relating to the alleged oral contract are immaterial
because of the contract's unenforceability.
Hence, it
contends that an adjudication by trial court was
appropriately based on the undisputed material facts.
What these assertions ignore is that the remaining
disputed facts raise the possible applicability of a
least two exemptions from the UCC Statute of Frauds.
Id. at 274.

The court further stated as follows:

By
ruling
that
the
Statute
of
Frauds
rendered
unenforceable Callison's alleged oral agreement for the
rental of tanks, trial court foreclosed Callison from the
opportunity of eliciting an admission by M & W of the
contract in court, on cross-examination or otherwise. He
was denied the right implied by [UCC § 2-201(3) (b)] to
prove the applicability of an exception to the UCC
Statute of Frauds through events which might yet occur in
court.

21

. . . [T] he Statute of Frauds . . . may not be raised by
a motion to dismiss. . . . [T]he Statute of Frauds is
simply a rule of evidence, which governs only the manner
of proving a contract, not its validity. Thus, the party
resisting the Statute should be given the opportunity to
prove the alleged contract in two statutorily recognized
ways: by the opposing party's failure to deny the
existence of the contract in its responsive pleading and
by the opposing party's emitting oral evidence of the
contract.
Id. at 275.
In Reissman International Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, Inc.,
10 UCCRS 1165

(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972), the New York court denied a

motion for summary judgment in a case involving the sale of wood
cabinets upon the basis that a summary judgment is inappropriate in
light of UCC § 2-201(3)(b).

The court stated as follows:

Whether or not plaintiff may, through the use of
discovery proceedings after answer obtain a testimonial
admission of the alleged contract from defendant has not
yet been passed upon in New York. This court concludes
that it may . . . .
"The statute was not designed to protect a party who made
an oral contract, but rather to aid a party who did not
make a contract, though one is claimed to have been
orally made for him."
This motion was brought on prior to any discovery
proceedings. The possibility exists that plaintiff there
or on trial may be able to obtain an admission by
defendant of the entire contract as claimed.
Id. at 1167-1168. (cites omitted).
In light of the above authorities, if it were the intent of
UCC § 2-201(3) (b) that a complaint alleging an oral contract which
22

on its face is within the statute of frauds may be

summarily

dismissed,

then

which

is

what

happened

in

this

case,

the

application of UCC § 2-201(3) (b) can always be avoided with a
summary judgment.

However, this is clearly not the intent of the

statute and the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for
summary judgment was in error.

CONCLUSIONS
Appellant

respectfully

urges

this

court

to

reverse

the

Judgment granted below and instruct the lower court to find that a
contract has been admitted, that the statute of frauds defense may
not be considered, and remand the matter for trial on the remaining
issues.
DATED this

of August, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,

23

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Trisha Hamner, do hereby certify that I mailed first class,
postage prepaid, two
Brief

(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing

of the Appellant, on this

day of August,

1997, to:

Gayle F. McKeachnie/Clark A. McClellan, McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.
Attorneys
Utah

for Defendant-Appellee,

121 West Main Street, Vernal,

84078.

Taeisir

t u e s rmderkn.app

24

Secretary

ADDENDUM
A.

Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-201

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3

C.

Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

D.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

E.

Reissman International Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products,
Inc.. 10 UCCRS 1165 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972)
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SALES

70A-2-201

{hereto but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract
lor the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject m a t t e r is to be
severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at
the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present
sale before severance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third-party lights
provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be
executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall
then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract
for sale.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, g 2-107; 1977,
c h . 272, $ 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ftand and gravel.
A contract to provide sand, gravel, and aggreg.tie is a contract for the sale of goods, governed

by the UCC. Salt Lake City Corp. v Kasler
Corp . 855 F Supp 1560 (D. Utah 199 1)

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
C.J.S. — 77A C.J S. Sales § 15.

PART 2

FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF
CONTRACT
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate t h a t a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this p a r a g r a p h beyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
Subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (1) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate t h a t the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments
for their procurement; or
39

70A-2-201

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court t h a t a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment h a s been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606).
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, c h . 154, § 2-201.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Price payable in
money, goods, realtv. or otherwise, § 70A-2304.

S t a t u t e of frauds generally, Chapter 5 of Title
25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Application.
Where buyer was in possession of wheat as
bailee and after oral contract for sale thereof
was entered into he requested extension of time
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of
s t a t u t e of frauds. J a m e s Mack Co. v. Bear River
Milling Co., 63 U t a h 565, 227 P. 1033, 36 A.L.R.
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uniform Commercial Code).
Because amount involved in oral contract for
sale of turkey poults was in excess of $500, plea
of s t a t u t e of frauds precluded its enforcement.
Tanner v. Childers. 108 Utah 455, 160 P.2d 965
(1945) (decided u n d e r former law).

ANALYSIS

Acceptance and receipt of goods.
Admission of contract's existence.
Application.
"Between merchants" exception.
Confirmatory memorandum.
Contract for work.
Definitions.
Modification of contract.
Part performance.
Pleading statute.
Proving nature of agreement.
Purpose.
Requirements.
Stock transactions.
Sufficiency of memorandum or writing.
A c c e p t a n c e a n d r e c e i p t of g o o d s .
It is a question for jury to determine whether
or not defendant is to be deemed to have
accepted the goods by his failure to reject t h e m
within a reasonable time. Lauer v. Richmond
Coop Mercantile Inst.. 8 Utah 305, 31 P. 397
(1892) (decided under former law).
Either words or conduct may be sufficient to
show acceptance of goods although the inference to be drawn from either should be clear
and unequivocal. J a m e s Mack Co. v. Bear River
Milling Co . 63 Utah 565, 227 P. 1033, 36 A.L.R.
643 (1924) (decided under former law).
Manual and actual receipt of the goods is not
required; symbolic, constructive, or implied
possession is sufficient. Hudson Furn. Co. v.
Freed Furn. & Carpet Co., 10 U t a h 3 1 , 36 P. 132
(1894) (decided under former law).
A d m i s s i o n of c o n t r a c t ' s e x i s t e n c e .
Admission by party to a transaction between
a merchant and a nonmerchant t h a t he would
have consideied himself bound by their oral
agreement if he had received confirmation of it
within a reasonable time did not bring into
operation the provisions of Subsection (3Kb)
and validate the otherwise unenforceable
agreement. Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223
<Utah 1976).

"Between m e r c h a n t s " exception.
Since a farmer, party to a transaction with a
grain dealer, was not a "merchant" within the
meaning of this section, Subsection (2) did not
apply and the s t a t u t e of frauds rendered unenforceable an oral agreement to sell the farmer's
whole wheat crop, valued substantially in excess of $500. Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223
(Utah 1976).
Where buyer was in possession of wheat as
bailee and after oral contract for sale theieof
was entered into he requested extension of time
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of
statute of frauds. J a m e s Mack Co. v. Bear River
Milling Co., 63 U t a h 565, 227 P. 1033, 36 A.L.R.
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uniform Commercial Code).
Confirmatory memorandum,
Where two elephant merchants agreed over
the telephone to the sale and purchase of the
animal "Peggy," and buyer sent seller a letter
confirming the terms of the sale agreement, the
s t a t u t e of frauds was satisfied, since it did not
appear t h a t seller had objected to the memor a n d u m in writing. Miller v. Kaye, 545 P.2d 199
(Utah 1975).
C o n t r a c t for w o r k .
Oral agreement whereby company agreed to
build auto trailer for use in business by cash
register salesman was not a sale but a contract
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JUDICIAL CODE

(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, c h . 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other

78-2a-3.

panels of t h a t court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
R2d 677 (Utah 1995).

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the s'ate or other local agencies; and
(ii; a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
14
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the U t a h Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any m a t t e r over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, c h . 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, c h . 268, § 22; 1992, c h . 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2 »< h) and redesignated former Subsections
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through
(k)
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted Boaid of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4)
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
substituted "School and Institutional Trust

Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestiy actions le vie wed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural
Resouices" for "Board of State Lands" in Subsection (2)(a)
The 1996 amendment by ch 159, effective
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry,
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestiy" in Subsection (2)(a)
The 1996 amendment by ch 198, effective
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d),
listing appeals from circuit couits, and redesignated foimer Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as
(2)(djto(2)(j)
This section is set out as leconciled by the
Office of Legislative Reseat ch and General
Counsel
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of militaiy court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Extraordinary writs.
The Couit of Appeals had jurisdiction over a
petition for a writ of mandamus dnected
against a judge of the district court based on its
authority under this section to enforce compliance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction Barnard v Murphy,
882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994)
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jui isdiction —
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing
from the jurisdiction of the Couit of Appeals —
because jurisdiction over petitions foi extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a court's jurisdiction to consider a petition ongmally filed
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction
over cases that originated el&ewhere Barnard
v Murphy, 882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994)
Because, under this section, the Court of

ANAI YSIS

Decisionb of Boaid of Pardons
Extraordinary writs
Final urder
Habeas coipus proceedings
Post-corn iction review
Scope
— Sentence reduction
Cited
D e c i s i o n s of Board of P a r d o n s .
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, except v. hen the petition additionally challenges
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree
felon\ or a capital felony Then the appeal is to
be heard by the Supreme Court Preece v
Hou*e, 886 P 2 d 508 (Utah 1994)
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TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity nf
the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996.)
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
26

C . j ! s S - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
t r i a l j o r filing 0 f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^255
F
f™ to * v e » o t i c e °ff a P P I i c a t i o n *>r d e "
ault
reqmred only
f
>»****£ ^%\T\TJB
bv
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.LR3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

f

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facta aa would be admiaaible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
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there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . • - This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Contempt generally,
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Applicability.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
—Wills.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.

Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.
—Guardianship.
—Mortgage note.
—Negligence.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
—Note.
—Recovery for goods and services.
—Stock ownership.
—Wrongful possession.
Summary judgment proper.
—Contract action.
—Contract terms.
—Deceit.
—Employee status.
—Jurisdiction.
—Negligence.
—Proximate cause.
—Res ipsa loquitur.
Time for motion.
Written statement of grounds.
Cited.
Affidavit
—Contents.
Specific facts are required to show whether
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776
(Utah 1984).
When a motion for summary judgment is
made under this rule, the affidavit of an adverse party must contain specific evidentiary
facts showing t h a t there is a genuine issue for
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747
(Utah 1985).
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff t h a t con-
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bility of unconscionability, and the necessity for a hearing is then )>y
obviated.
Having established that the semiconductors sold to Macarr wrm
not warranted for merchantability and fitness, the third-party defendant is entitled to a dismissal of the third-party complaint. Set Ho
judgment.

pired. The third paragraph of the written warranty has the disclaimer provision:

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. v. PIKE
Arkansas Supreme Court, February 15, 1971, rehearing denied
May 10, 1971
249 Ark 1026, 466 SW2d 901
HI 1201, fl 2316] Conspicuousnees of disclaimer of warranties.
Disclaimer clause in warranty of a truck was ineffective to disclaim implied
warranties since it was not conspicuous, in that it was printed in small, nariowly
spaced type. In addition, there was evidence that the warranty was deli\ • HI<1
to buyer some time after the sale was made, constituting a unilateral att< mpl
of the seller to limit its obligations.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hot Spring County.
BROWN, Justice. Appellee Earl Pike obtained judgment for personal injuries and property damage against International Harvester
Company and its Malvern distributor, Burks Motors, Inc., as a result
of a mechanical failure of appellee's International transport truck,
which failure substantially wrecked the transport and caused serious
injuries to appellee. This appeal is by International, in which several points for reversal are submitted and to which we shall later
refer. . . .

Since the case must be reversed because of the errors wo h.ive
discussed, we shall touch only on those remaining points of appellant
which are likely to arise upon retrial.
8. The court erred in giving instructions and submitting interrogatories to the jury pertaining to breach of warranty. The
trial court, by appropriate instructions and an interrogatory, submitted the issue of implied warranty of merchantability. The trial
court refused to submit the question of express warranty, apparent ly
for the reason that the warranty had, according to its terms, e\-
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"This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied,
including without limitation, warranties of MERCHANTABILITY and
FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE, all other representations to
the original purchaser, and all other obligations or liabilities, including
liability for incidental and consequential damages, on the part of the
Company or the seller. No person is authorized to give any other warranties or to assume any other liability on the Company's behalf unless made or assumed in writing by the Company, and no person is
authorized to give any warranties or to assume any liabilities on the
seller's behalf unless made or assumed in writing by the seller."

With the exception of what we have reproduced in caps the
remainder of the lettering is smaller than the type appearing on
this page, and the lines are narrowly spaced. We cannot classify
it as being conspicuous, which is one of the requirements of a
disclaimer. Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark 152,
437 SW2d 784 [6 UCC Rep 100] (1969); Mack Trucks v. Jet
Asphalt, 246 Ark 101, 437 SW2d 459 [6 UCC Rep 93] (1969).
Furthermore, there was substantial evidence that the warranty
was delivered to appellee some time after the sale was made, constituting "a unilateral attempt of a party to limit its obligations."
Mack Trucks v. Jet Asphalt, supra. The court was correct in submitting the issue of implied warranty.
Reversed and remanded.
HARRIS, C. J., and HOLT, J., are of the opinion that the trial
court was correct in refusing to submit to the jury the issue of
appellee's negligence.

REISSMAN INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. J. S. O. WOOD
PRODUCTS, INC.
New York Civil Court, Now York County
New York Law Journal, June 6, 1972, p 2
[1f 2104, If 2201] Statute of frauds.
A contract for the sale of goods for a price in excess of $500 was enforceable
whore the purchaser sent the seller a signed purchase order, both parties were
merchants, and the seller made no objection within ten days after receipt of
the order.
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CTJ2201] Statute of frauds—effect of admission of existence of contract.
An action to recover damages for defendant's alleged failure to deliver good i
covered by a purchase order will not be dismissed on motion, even 1 hough th«»
purchase order was not signed, where discovery proceedings have not been
had, since it is possible that plaintiff either through discovery or at the trml
may obtain an admission from defendant that a contract was made, which
under 5 2-201 (3) (b) would render the contract enforceable to the extent of th<»
quantity of goods admitted. Compelled testimony may be treated as an admission under § 2-201(3)(b).
UCC Sections Cited: §2-104(1), 8 2-201(1), (2), (3)(b).
EVANS, J. In this motion for damages sustained by reason of
defendant's failure to deliver 144 cabinets out of a total of 250
ordered, under two purchase orders, defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that then*
is no writing signed by the defendant and therefore claims that
the action is barred by the Statute of Frauds UCC § 2-201.
Defendant also counterclaims for $1,764 representing the unpaid balance of 63 cabinets, and a delivery charge.
The documents submitted by plaintiff in* opposition to the motion
consist, in pertinent part, of two purchase orders which wore sou!
to defendant. The first, No. 71-131 for 50 cabinets is signed by
the plaintiff; the second, No. 71-132 for 200 cabinets, is unsigned.
With respect to the purchase order 71-131, the statute has been
satisfied. Sub-paragraph (2) provides that "Between merchants
if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the parly
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after
it is received." Both parties are merchants, UCC §2-104(1) and
the purchase order was signed by the sender and no objection
thereto was made by defendant within the ten day period allowed
by the statute.
The second purchase order, No. 71-132 for 200 units sent by
plaintiff to defendant, presents further problems. It was unsigned,
and defendant denies that there was such a contract. UCC § 2-20)
(3) (b) provides that a contract, itself not sufficient because it
was not signed, is enforceable "if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleadings, testimony or otherwise in
court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is nol
enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted."
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Although defendant, in his answer, has denied the existence of
the contract alleged by plaintiff, the affidavits submitted show that
one invoice sent by defendant to plaintiff, refers to purchase order
No. 71-132, although the invoice is limited to 42 cabinets. Whether
or not plaintiff may, through the use of discovery proceedings after
answer obtain a testimonial admission of the alleged contract from
defendant has not yet been passed upon in New York (see Weiss
v. Wolin, 20 Misc2d 750). This court concludes that it may, and
therefore the portion of the motion seeking a dismissal of the
complaint is denied at this time. _
Although one respected commentator has stated that such compelled testimony is not to be regarded as an admission, (see Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, 2d Ed §2-201:45, p 281), the authority cited by him for that proposition states that lawyers and
judges are not in agreement on that point. Hawkland, Sales and
Bulk Sales, 1958 p 31. The various reports of the Law Revision
Commission show that it considered that the required admissions
might be compelled; see 1953 Law Revision Commission Report,
Recommendations and Studies, 65 "O", p 17, 18 and its J 955 Study
of the Uniform Commercial Code, at p 371.
In its 1957 Report, at p 23 the commission states that the 1953
proposal would include admissions by way of pleadings, bills of
particulars, depositions, affidavits, admissions pursuant to notices
to admit, and oral testimony, and its 1960 report at page 271
states "In the 1957 revision of the Code the 1952 version was changed
to provide that the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity
of goods admitted and to make it clear that it applied to admissions
on cross-examination."
The Statute of Frauds, designed to [prevent] perjurious proof
of an oral contract, has had ambiguous treatment by the courts.
Some have held that the requirement of a writing was an indispensable formality and a substantive requirement rendering an oral
contract entirely void; others have created exceptions where justice
required.
The limitations have been questioned, since the purpose of the
statute is fully satisfied if the defendant admits, in the particular
action, the making of the contract as claimed by plaintiff (see
Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 Cornell Law Quarterly,
1952 p 355). Other jurisdictions have reached this conclusion. In
Cohn v. Fisher, NJ Supreme Ct, Jan. 24, 1972, 10 UCC Rep
372, not yet otherwise reported, the court reaching this
conclusion under the Uniform Commercial Code, said, "The statute
was not designed to protect a party who made an oral contract,
1167
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but rather to aid a p a r t y who did not make a contract, though
one is claimed to have been orally made for him". (See also, Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga App 94, 147 SE2d 374 [3 UCC Rep 296] I960;
In re Particle Reduction Corp., USDCED Penna, Jan. 10, 1908,
Bankruptcy No. 29817; 60 Berks L J 65, 5 UCC Rep 242).
This motion was brought on prior to any discovery proceeding *.
The possibility exists t h a t plaintiff there or on trial may be able
to obtain an admission by defendant of the entire contract as
claimed.
Plaintiff has not opposed defendant's motion for judgment on
its counterclaim, except as to the price per cabinet, which is the sole
issue remaining as to the counterclaim. That issue should be tried
together with the plaintiff's claim. The motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and for judgment on the counterclaim
is accordingly denied.

BRIDGEWATER WASHED SAND & STONE CO., INC. v.
BRIDGEWATER MATERIALS, I N C
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, May 15, 1972
282 NE2d 912
[1J 2201] Statute of frauds.
Where a written contract for the sale of land and certain materials thereon
and an oral agreement explaining some of the language and terms of the writl-n
agreement were breached by the seller's failure to turn over to the buyer sonio
of the materials, the whole agreement was enforceable against the seller under
§ 2-201 since the seller had received the full consideration from the buyer.
UCC Section Cited: § 2-201(1), (3)(c).

Before
JJ.

TAURO,

C. J.,

CUTTER, SPIEGEL, REARDON

and

HENNESSEY,

James D. St. Clair for the defendants.
Harold Rosenwald for the plaintiff.
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Materials to Gerald I. Bern or his nominee. The buyer became
Bern's nominee. An agreement of purchase and sale (the original
agreement) was executed on May 24, 1965. 2 A supplementary agreement, dated June 21, 1965, defined by metes and bounds the land
to be excepted from the conveyance (the excepted parcel) and
created certain easements in favor of the buyer as lo the excepted
parcel. Lorusso, Materials' president and treasurer (In 1), signed
each agreement individually as well as for Materials. An auditor,
who made findings described below, assessed damages, recoverable
by the buyer, at $50,150. Subject to the defendants' exceptions,
a Superior Court judge denied their motion to recommit the auditor's
report, and allowed a motion for judgment for tho buyer on the
auditor's report. The case is before us on the defendants' bills of
exceptions.
The land sold consisted of about seventy acres in Bridgewater.
The excepted parcel contained about 6.2 acres. The original agreement (par 2) provided t h a t the "sale . . . shall include the sand
and gravel plant . . . on the [soldj premises, all equipment listed
. . . and processed and unprocessed sand and gravel." It further
provided (par 3), after referring to the excepted parcel, "Any
sand and gravel removed from this area at any time after passing
of papers, and any sand, gravel or stone stockpiled in this area
at the time of passing of papers shall be the property of the
[b]uyer, and the [b]uyer shall have the right to enter the area
to remove it for a reasonable . . . time" (emphasis supplied). The
supplementary agreement of June 21, 1965 (probably executed on
June 22), made a similar provision, in terms clearly applicable to
the excepted parcel. 3 Materials and Lorusso apparently assume t h a t
papers passed on June 22, 1965, although this is by no means wholly
clear from the auditor's report.
The parties stipulated before the auditor that the original agreement and the supplementary agreement "constitute the
written
agreements between the parties." From oral testimony of "witnesses for . . . the plaintiff [the buyer] and the defendants [i. e.
Materials and Lorusso] . . . attorneys and . . . accountants who

CUTTER, J. The plaintiff (the buyer) seeks to recover from the
corporate defendant (Materials) the value of stockpiled sand and
gravel or stone removed from three parcels of land sold (except
for part of one parcel on which there was an asphalt plant) by

2
The auditor referred in various places to this date as May 21, but it was
agreed at the arguments that the correct date was May 24. In quoting the
auditor's report, this correction has been made.
3
The supplementary agreement provided (par 5) "that the purchase price
was allocated by the parties as follows: $100,000 for the land; $70,000 for the
building; and $10,000 for the stockpiles." The auditor found that these
allocations were not "an expression of the accurate value of . . . [the] inventory . . . or . . . stockpiles but" represented figures "insisted upon by . . .
[Materials and Lorusso] for tax purposes."
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